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Abstract 
 
‘Power’ has been a foundational concept in examining global value chains and production 
networks for understanding patterns and dynamics in the global political economy. Yet, in most 
GVC scholarship, power is not explicitly defined and is applied as a unitary concept, rather than 
as having multiple dimensions.  Clarifying the concept of power has become particularly urgent in 
recent years given the proliferation of new GVC frameworks, which extend beyond dyads of 
transacting firms or firm-state linkages, to incorporate other stakeholders and mechanisms – 
including NGOs, labor unions, standards and conventions.  In this paper, we propose a typology 
for the varied meanings and usages of power in GVCs. We delineate two principal dimensions of 
power: transmission mechanisms – direct and diffuse; and arena of actors – dyads and collectives. 
Combined, these two dimensions yield four ideal types of power exercised in GVCs: bargaining, 
demonstrative, institutional and constitutive.  We offer brief illustrations of these four types of 
power and provide an agenda for further research in the field. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘Power’ has been a foundational concept in examining global value chains and production 
networks (hereafter, GVCs). However, over time, its usage and meaning (both implicit and 
explicit) has become overstretched.  In most GVC research (e.g. Gereffi et al 2005), power as a 
concept focuses on the uneven bargaining relationships between firms, especially between ‘lead’ 
firms and suppliers.  In the broader theoretical literature on power, this is commonly thought of as 
‘coercive’ power, in which one actor utilizes incentives or sanctions directly to compel another 
actor to act according to their wishes (Gereffi 1994).  As such, coercive power has the 
characteristics of being highly intentional, conflict-oriented and resource-centric.  
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However, as the analytic lens of GVCs has expanded, different applications of the concept of 
power have come to the fore, running the gamut from formal to informal. For instance, firms and 
other actors increasingly come to agreement over explicit and formal industrial standards and 
certifications, and over more informal conventions, best practices and norms (Ponte and Gibbon 
2005, Nadvi 2009).  Likewise, consumer and social movements can shape GVCs, and also vary in 
their degree of formal organization (Bair and Palpacuer 2015).  Various levels of state action and 
authority also have structuring effects on GVCs (Neilson and Pritchard 2009, Jespersen et al 2014).  
While these socioeconomic structures might include elements of cooperation and collective action, 
they can also be highly contentious, and when fully consolidated, embody and fix power 
relationships in ways that systematically create winners and losers.  In other instances – such as in 
certain pathways of modularization, financialization, and network organization – power can be 
exerted in even more ‘diffuse’ ways, e.g. by example. Collective and emergent outcomes can be 
generated, as Hayek said, ‘by human action, but not by human design’ (Dallas 2014). Thus, GVC 
research does not always focus on the exertion of power by any clearly defined ‘lead firm’ or other 
powerful firm-level actors.  
 
While concepts of power commonly appear (often implicitly) in GVC scholarship, the topic has 
not been systematically theorized. Power is not explicitly defined and it is most often applied as a 
unitary concept rather than having multiple dimensions. To begin to fill this gap, this paper reviews 
the varied usages of power in GVC and GVC-adjacent literatures and offers a framework to help 
systematize the concept.  It also explores forms of power that have been less thoroughly 
considered, as well as more emergent forms (e.g. the ‘ecosystems’ surrounding successful 
technology platforms). 
 
One difficulty in creating such a framework is that the concept of ‘power’ itself is malleable, and 
notoriously open to interpretation.   It a prime example of an ‘essentially contested concept,’ in 
which there are unresolvable definitional disputes over meaning (Gallie 1956). As a result, the 
meanings of power have proliferated: witness the extensive literature on the ‘faces’ of power (Dahl 
1956, Lukes 1974, Digeser 1992),1 or the debate over whether power should be thought of only as 
inhering within well-defined actors (Baldwin 1989, 2002), should be limited to ‘intentional’ 
actions (Guzzini 1993, 2000), whether forms of ‘persuasion’ should be considered power 
(Lindblom 1977), and whether instances of mutual benefit and agreement can embody power 
(Oppenheim 1981).  
 
We focus on the concept of power as it applies to various understandings of governance, 
restructuring, and evolution in GVCs.   We draw from broader theoretical discussions of power, 
but do so selectively because, in our view, not all forms of power are equally useful in GVC 
analysis.  Even though more recent contributions (e.g., Jespersen et al 2014, Bair and Palpacuer 
2015) do incorporate non-firm actors, the GVC literature primarily focuses on voluntary exchanges 
between transacting firms – an area less commonly theorized in the broader literature on power.  
Yet, the concept of power in firms and industries is well developed.  For example, the concept of 
market power is central to the industrial organization and market structure literatures (Chamberlin 
                                                 
1 Very briefly, these are what might be referred to as resource power (Dahl 1956), agenda-setting power (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962), ideological/structural power (Lukes 1974) and discursive power (Digeser 1992), though the 
authors do not necessarily use this exact jargon – in part because some understand their version as simply the 
embodiment of ‘power’ itself as a singular concept.    
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1933, Williamson 1975).  Power resides in the Schumpeterian barriers to entry created by firm-
level capabilities that are difficult, time consuming, or impossible for competitors to replicate 
(Penrose 1959, Teece et al 1997).  The concepts of market power, barriers to entry, organizational 
learning, and asset specificity have all been utilized in GVC and GVC-related theory building 
(Ernst and O’Connor 1992, Sturgeon 2002, 2009, Gereffi et al 2005, Fujita 2010, Ponte and 
Sturgeon 2014).  However, the expanding field of GVC research necessitates a look back at how 
power has been theorized, and a sustained consideration of its broader aspects, commonly analyzed 
in more general theories of power.   
 
From this exercise, we construct a stylized typology of power in GVCs.  We categorize power as 
possessing two-dimensions: an ‘arena of actors’ and ‘transmission mechanisms’.  Within the arena 
of actors, we specify how power is wielded in dyads and collectives.  To date, much of the GVC 
literature has been concerned with dyadic relations between individual buyers (lead firms) and 
suppliers (e.g. Gereffi et al 2005); but more collective approaches to power and governance in 
GVCs have also emerged, looking at the role of, for instance, government, business associations 
and social movements.  
 
The distinction between more institutionalized collectives (such as multi-stakeholder initiatives or 
the state) and looser social formations and groupings is embedded in our second dimension, the 
transmission mechanisms of power.2  This concept is anchored by two ideal types: direct and 
diffuse.  On the one end of the spectrum are circumstances in which GVC actors (individually or 
collectively) seek to exert direct forms of influence over other actors or actor groups.  This form 
of power is relatively unambiguous.  Actors can clearly identify each other, their actions are 
intentional and goal-oriented, specific actors ‘possess’ power and the tools and methods of exerting 
it.  Transmission mechanisms are more formal and explicit and can be quite specific in their detail 
(e.g. defined in contracts).  The other end of the spectrum consists of more diffuse forms of power 
in which the actors or collectives and the objects of power may be less clearly identifiable, and 
actions less intentional.  While diffuse power can sometimes result in unintended but substantively 
important outcomes, the locus of power may reside outside the organizational boundaries of any 
well-defined set of actors. The transmission mechanisms for diffuse power can be imprecise, such 
as those emerging from social movements or through the uncodified ‘best practices’ that tend to 
propagate with new managerial models (Bodrozic and Alder 2017), or the interplay of hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic forces.  Combining these two dimensions yields a four-category typology 
that incorporates many of the types of power observed in GVCs: bargaining, demonstrative, 
institutional and constitutive (see Figure 1) 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  First, we discuss how power has been approached in the GVC 
literature.  Second, we further delineate the two principal dimensions of our typology of power in 
GVCs: the transmission mechanisms of power (direct and diffuse) and the arenas of actors (dyadic 
and collective), and then describe the four types of power that emerge from this typology. Third, 
we provide three brief examples of how the four types can be used and combined to analyze how 
power is exercised in a specific GVC.  In the final section, we reflect on the methodological 
implications of examining power through different lenses and provide an agenda for further 
research and theory building.  
                                                 
2 As we will explain, more institutionalized collectives tend to exert power directly, while looser collectives do so in 
a more diffuse manner. 
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2. A Genealogy of Power in Global Value Chains 
 
In early GVC literature, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994: 17) defined a Global Commodity Chain 
(GCC) as ‘a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished 
commodity’, and set out an agenda for analyzing how chains are structured by a set of ‘dominant 
agents.’  This approach examined the distribution of gains across GCCs, and stressed that high 
value, high rent-producing segments of the chain would tend to remain in the global ‘core’ while 
less profitable activities were dispersed to ‘peripheral’ countries. Despite the innovation of framing 
the global economy as an amalgam of (more or less) global industries, rather than only discrete 
national economies competing internationally on the basis of domestic factor endowments, the 
principal driver of the geography and structure of the chain was the power held by states to shape 
the chain as investment and goods crossed borders, and even more importantly by the direct and 
indirect actions of global hegemons to ensure that high value segment were retained in core 
countries, by force if necessary. All this precluded the possibility of ‘upgrading’ in peripheral 
countries and locked in global patterns of uneven development (Brewer 2011). 
  
Gereffi (1994, 1999), however, saw power in GCCs as linked to the ability of lead firms to ‘drive’ 
the organization of international production networks, and also for states to craft industrial policies, 
especially for export-oriented industrialization, that allowed them to ‘upgrade’ their position to 
higher value activities over time.  Gereffi especially emphasized the role of buyer-driven chains in 
the sustained export-led success of a handful of East Asian economies from the 1950s through the 
1980s, including Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. He noted that their 
exports were mainly in ‘labor-intensive consumer products such as apparel, footwear, toys, and 
sporting goods,’ and that upgrading took place from simple assembly to ‘full package’ supply, 
which included backward linkages to intermediate inputs, sub-coordination of the chain by 
intermediate actors (e.g. trading companies), and forward moves into design and in some cases 
branding (1999: 38).  In the buyer-driven pattern of international production, the power of ‘high-
capacity’ states (Evans 1995) to work in tandem with business elites to upgrade the position of 
their domestic companies in global industries dovetailed with the strategies of retailers and branded 
merchandisers, especially in the United States but also in Europe, to source lower cost consumer 
goods to feed the ‘retail revolution’ at home (Feenstra and Hamilton 2006). This set off a co-
evolutionary dynamic between buyer and supplier strategies that Kimura (2007: 97-98) refers to 
as ‘dynamic external fit.’   
 
In this context, GVC membership, especially for developing country firms, provides possibilities 
for accessing knowledge, markets and valuable competitive assets in the global economy (Taglioni 
and Winkler 2016).  However, these advantages are seen as contingent on the terms of inclusion 
and exclusion imposed by lead firms. This further underlines the power of key agents and their 
capacity to outsource value-added activities to less powerful actors, or to exclude them either 
initially or in subsequent rounds of contracting (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Neilson and Pritchard 
2009).  As GVCs and GVC research have matured, these contingencies have loosened – unleashing 
a robust stream of research and theory-building related to the sources of supplier competence (e.g. 
Kawakami 2011) and various upgrading paths travelled by suppliers and lead firms in developing 
countries (e.g. Brandt and Thun 2010, Fujita 2010). To sum up the discussion of buyer-driven 
governance, non-hegemonic agency (at the level of firms or developing country policies) was 
nowhere to be found in Hopkins and Wallerstein’s conception of GCCs, yet was everywhere in 
5 
 
Gereffi’s: in upstart retailers seizing control over their own supply chains, in the developmental 
state, and even in the strategies of lowly suppliers seeking to upgrade their role in relation to global 
buyers. 
 
The key to understanding how this is possible lies in the other form of governance highlighted by 
Gereffi (1994): the ‘producer-driven’ chain.  These chains were found in industries such as 
electronics and automobiles where lead firms directly controlled production and internationalized 
through foreign direct investment and the formation of affiliated firms, creating the classic 
multinational corporation (MNC).  This more traditional mode of internationalization was a tighter 
fit with Hopkins and Wallerstein’s conception of GCCs, since the ownership and high value 
functions in MNCs remained firmly in the core (at headquarters), even as factories were set up 
overseas to jump over tariff walls. The ability of MNCs to dominate developing country markets, 
especially in technology-intensive goods such as automobiles, stemmed from a series of firm-
specific advantages that offset any ‘liability of foreignness’ emerging from cultural, economic, 
institutional or geographic distance (Vernon 1971, Buckley and Casson 1976, Dunning 1988).  The 
drive to continue to vertically integrate, even as (or especially when) production was set up abroad, 
stemmed from the need to source suitable intermediate inputs, which were generally unavailable 
from local firms.  In producer-driven networks, the international production network was 
internalized within the giant multinational firm (Rugman et al 2011).   
 
Gereffi’s introduction of the buyer-driven model was novel, and – because of the very thinness, or 
even absence, of lead firms’ international operational footprint – called a key source of power in 
international business theory into question: the ‘international’ advantage of cross-border 
operational scale and efficiency, and by extension the assumption that local suppliers could not 
meet requirements.  Additionally, the assumption in international business scholarship that the 
purpose of the MNC was to supply international markets was also turned on its head. Attention 
shifted from the gradual replication of MNC’s home operations abroad to a ‘new international 
division of labor’ (Fröbel et al 1980) where export-oriented, cost cutting ‘maquiladora’ plants and 
‘global factories’ (Grunwald and Flamm 1985) concentrated labor-intensive slices of the value 
chain in places with lower labor costs such as Mexico, North Africa, and East and South-East Asia.  
The market focus of global buyers, at least initially, was to undercut domestic competition at home, 
and their success at doing so demonstrated that low-cost products could be supplied and even 
rapidly replenished through international outsourcing. And, as large market developmental states 
such Brazil, India and China opened to large scale FDI in the 1990s (unlike South Korea or Japan), 
increasingly stringent local content requirements began to place MNCs under pressure to source 
more intermediate inputs locally.  
 
Although Gereffi did not specify the sources of power in buyer-driven or producer-driven chains, 
Sturgeon (2009) pointed to technological intensity as the main differentiator.  In producer-driven 
chains, manufacturing processes represent difficult-to-replicate set of competencies and 
intellectual property that renders outsourcing unwise, difficult, and even impossible.  However, 
with global industries growing rapidly in scope and scale, and changing their character in the 1990s 
and 2000s – with formerly producer-driven industries taking on some of the characteristics of 
buyer-driven chains – a dynamic theory was needed rather than a static typology.  The result was 
a GVC ‘governance’ theory focused on a few key conditions (transactional complexity, 
codifiability of information and supplier capability) that structured how lead firms linked to 
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suppliers (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Sturgeon 2002, Humphrey and Schmitz 2008, Gereffi et al 
2005).  While this did not retain the highly intentional term of ‘driving’ from the GCC stream, and 
the focus of governance shifted from driving to linking (Gibbon et al 2008), the assumption was 
still that the main power dynamic in business relationships would be coercive in character, and 
that some level of power asymmetry would be required for lead firms to engage in the ‘explicit 
coordination’ of the chain that differentiated GVCs from regular arms-length trade.  The degree of 
this power asymmetry was theorized to run from very high, in the ‘hierarchies’ of foreign affiliates 
and their headquarters, to very low in pure arms-length ‘markets,’ with ‘captive,’ ‘relational’ and 
‘modular’ falling in between (Gereffi et al 2005). 
 
To sum up, Gereffi (1994: 97), lists ‘governance structure’ as one of three dimensions of any GCC 
(along with its input-output structure and territoriality),3 defined as the ‘authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow 
within the chain.’  Subsequent work on GVCs started to explore varieties of power by highlighting 
the relative position of suppliers in the chain, and by specifying the expected degree of power 
asymmetry along the spectrum of GVC governance types.  However, the move from GCC to GVC 
analysis did not carry with it an explicit analysis or theory of power. The rise of global suppliers 
and platform leaders such as Intel led some to speculate that a new era of supplier-led value chains 
was dawning (e.g. Borrus and Zysman 1997). But in the end, with a few exceptions, the ability of 
lead firms to determine the functional division of labor along a commodity/value chain through 
the exercise of buyer power has continued to appear as the central hypothesis, and empirical result, 
of most firm- and industry-level GVC research.  The approach is actor-oriented, focused on 
identifying lead firms that exercise power in the chain (Gereffi 1994), characterizing how they do 
it (Gereffi at al 2005), and with what consequences (Milberg and Winkler 2013). Relations of 
power are seen as asymmetrically embedded in ‘make or buy’ decisions.  The ability of lead firms 
to choose and switch between suppliers allows them to demand additional services and ever-lower 
real unit prices from suppliers. This also allows GVC researchers to associate different functional 
roles along a chain to specific allocations of resources and distribution of gains (Kaplinsky 2005). 
Despite this centrality, it seems clear enough that the concept of power in the mainstream literature 
on GVC governance was left under-theorized.   
 
After the mid-2000s, a different approach to power in GVC developed, rooted in the concept of 
‘governance as normalizing’– the process of re-aligning a given practice to be compatible with a 
standard or norm (see Gibbon et al 2008). This process includes important elements of self-
regulation. To highlight ideational processes and contestations in GVC governance processes, this 
work has drawn on convention theory (Ponte 2002, 2009, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Ouma 2010), 
but also on governmentality (Gibbon and Ponte 2008, Ouma 2015, Raj-Reichert 2013) and on neo-
Gramscian approaches (Levy 2008, Bair and Palpacuer 2015).  It has shown how GVC governance 
can be shaped by standards and certifications on quality and sustainability, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social movements.  Some of this work is 
focused on the negotiations, compromises and pedagogies of ‘quality’ (including the social and 
environmental traits of products and services) and has sought to explain how the shaping of ideas, 
content, measurement devices, and operationalization of quality is an essential part of how power 
relations are shaped and governance put in place (Nadvi 2008, Quark 2011). While this work 
                                                 
3 Gereffi and Tam (1998: 5) later added a fourth dimension, the ‘institutional setting that specifies local, national, 
and international conditions that shape each activity within the chain.’  
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highlights how control over the qualification of specific products can be a key source of power for 
‘lead firms,’ it also reveals how counter-actions by other value chain actors can sometimes 
challenge the status quo.  This literature provides windows into the micro-foundations of power, 
but also its meso-aspects, for example, how quality conventions are transmitted in space and along 
the value chain (Ponte 2009, Ponte and Sturgeon 2014). It has also broadened the possible set of 
governing actors beyond lead firms and suppliers, and how they exercise power in GVCs.  The 
result is a more nuanced view of how buyer power is wielded, including instances where its 
expression can be disguised.  
 
Another set of broadening contributions has highlighted processes of disarticulation and counter-
action in governance. What brings these theoretically diverse approaches together is a general 
movement away from an interest in buyer-determined governance dynamics, and towards: a) 
highlighting the strategic logic of suppliers exiting from GVCs in specific situations; b) the 
processes of suppliers clawing back power from lead firms; and/or c) the increasingly important 
role of actors not directly involved in value adding activities. The disarticulation approach is 
formulated most coherently in Bair and Werner (2011, Bair et al 2013). Their implicit take on 
power shifts attention from the dynamics of integrative efforts (participation in value chains) to a 
more nuanced picture that includes the agency that allows less powerful actors to disarticulate and 
disentangle from uneven and exploitative GVCs relations, or exert the power of refusing to 
participate – leading to the consideration of alternative actors, non-actors, and anti-actors (see also 
Berndt and Boekler 2011, Havice and Campling 2013, Goger 2013).  
 
As we can see, many GVC contributions have sought to tame some of the inevitability of ‘buyer 
power’ in the earlier literature by showing how key suppliers in some industries have been able to 
establish increasingly powerful positions (e.g. Sturgeon 2002, 2009, Tewari 2005, Kawakami 
2011, Raj-Reichert 2015), or by highlighting paths and strategies that suppliers can follow to not 
only create value, but also to retain it (Kaplinsky 2005, Fujita 2011, Sako and Zylberberg 2016) 
Such possibilities can lead to reconfigurations of governance away from unipolarity, where most 
power is concentrated in one functional position in the value chain, towards multipolarity, where 
power is more equally distributed across different functional positions (Fold 2002, Ponte et al 
2014). Multipolarity can also involve other actors outside the value chain, such as international 
NGOs, trade unions, governments, and multi-stakeholder initiatives (Nadvi and Raj-Reichert 
2015). This stream of GVC literature also examines how firm-level GVC governance interacts 
with global governance – such as with transnational sustainability governance — where lead firms 
may not be the most important agents (Bair and Palpacuer 2015). 
 
Finally, a cognate literature on Global Production Networks (GPNs) focuses on more complex 
configurations of economic activity than the linear ones used in the GVC literature, and  highlights 
the complexity and variety of non-firm actors in shaping the organization of economic activity 
(Henderson et al 2002, Hess and Yeung 2006, Coe et al 2008, Coe and Yeung 2015).  In an effort 
to break down power into different forms, the GPN literature proposed a three-way distinction 
between corporate, institutional (largely ‘state’ power), and collective (non-firm, non-state) power. 
Thus, this framework places primary emphasis on the different types of actors, which is similar to 
one of our two dimensions – the ‘arena of actors.’4 However, it only conceptualizes the exercise 
                                                 
4 While Henderson et al (2002) differentiate state and non-state actors into distinct categories (institutional and 
collective, respectively), in our framework, any situation involving more than the standard dyad (two actors, like 
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of power between actors in ways that we categorize as ‘direct’ transmission of power. In more 
recent work, GPN scholars have proposed a structural-cum-relational approach to how power in 
GPNs shapes economic organization (Coe and Yeung 2015: 65; see also the distinction between 
resource and bargaining power in Mahutga 2014). They argue that a structural approach to 
understanding power in a network is based not only on examining a firm’s position within the 
network (i.e., its network centrality), but also of the strength of association (network density); and 
that structural positions do not automatically lead to pre-ordained power balances since power is 
exercised in contingent and contextual situations. Actors thus ‘draw upon different forms of power 
in order to take on an advantageous position in GPNs that favor their value creation, retention, and 
capture’ (Coe and Yeung 2015: 66-67).  
 
In a recent effort to update and clarify the concept of global production networks (GPN 2.0), Coe 
and Yeung (2015: 66) offer an explicit definition of power as: ‘the capacity of an actor to exercise 
and achieve control over a particular strategic outcome in its own interests’.  This definition of 
power conceptualizes it as mainly embodied within well-defined ‘actors’ engaged in ‘intentional’ 
action (i.e. is ‘strategic’).  As in earlier writing, power in ‘GPN 2.0’ is mainly focused on instances 
of direct control by specific actors over clearly defined outcomes.  As such, it most closely 
resembles classic definitions of power, such as Robert Dahl’s (1956: 202-3) in which:  ‘[Actor] A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’.  
While this form of power is certainly common and widely exerted in actor networks, researchers 
need a more expansive understanding of power, including power that is more diffuse, and power 
that is exerted by collectives of actors where the membership boundaries are permeable, and thus 
hard to conceptualize as an ‘actor’ exerting ‘intentional’ actions.  
 
Furthermore, power need not always possess a ‘negative’ valence or necessarily be ‘conflict-
oriented,’ even though conflict has been common in many of its conceptualizations, including 
Dahl’s (1956), as well as Weber’s (1947) classic ‘carrying out of one’s will despite resistance’ and 
Blau’s (1964) ‘influence over behavior through negative sanctions.’  Power underlies even 
voluntary transactions in which all parties mutually benefit from cooperation, or when there is 
absolute symmetry between transacting actors as in open market exchanges.  However, in GPN 
2.0, power in production networks is mainly conflict-oriented and seen as ‘the ability of one actor 
to affect the behavior of another actor in a manner contrary to the second actor’s interests, [and] 
can also reflect the ability of one actor to resist an unwanted imposition by another actor’ (Coe 
and Yeung 2015: 17, emphasis added).  Here, Coe and Yeung seem to imply that power is a less 
relevant concept in more equal or balanced ‘relational’ inter-firm linkages. However, in literatures 
that address inter-firm power, such as the longstanding ‘power dependence theory’ (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978), ‘mutual dependence’ is one construct of inter-firm power and distinct from ‘power 
imbalance,’ each leading to different empirical outcomes (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005).  For 
instance, bargaining power in negotiations between firms with ‘relational’ ties is important, even 
between equally co-dependent firms in which each possesses resources desired by the other firm 
and when the transaction is fully voluntary.  In fact, except in the most extreme instances, nearly 
all transactions studied in the GVC and GPN literatures are voluntary and for the purpose of mutual 
                                                 
buyer-supplier or state-firm bargaining) is categorized as a ‘collective.’  This may include any combination of state 
agencies, non-government institutions, and even large collectives of individuals, even if they are not fully 
incorporated into a well-defined organization, such as in social movements, or when ideas, best practices and other 
conventions diffuse among actors.   
9 
 
(albeit often unequal) benefit.  There may be imbalances in dependency and competency, but even 
symmetrical relationships are imbued with power.  It is just that in relational linkages, the balance 
of power is more equal than in some other forms of governance (i.e. captive). 
 
In the rest of this paper, we acknowledge that coercive power is certainly common and widely 
exerted, but argue that a more expansive understanding of power is needed, including power that 
is diffuse, and power that is possessed by specific actors as well as collectives.  Following Dallas 
(2014), we cover both agentic-strategic and non-agentic power at different levels of analysis.  In 
some cases, this can include self-organizing collectives that emerge as the unintended outcome of 
the aggregate actions of unrelated firms. Thus, rather than circumscribing the concept of power, 
we adopt a moderately expansive scope, in which the locus of power need not always inhere within 
specific power-wielding actors, need not always be exerted with full intentionality, and need not 
be exhibited in overt inter-actor conflicts (though, of course, all of these do exist in GVCs). At the 
same time, our conceptualization of power is not boundless, in that it steers clear of meanings of 
power that are less useful for GVC analysis.5  
 
We begin by differentiating the two main dimensions of our typology of power – the ‘transmission 
mechanisms’ of power and the ‘arena of actors.’ We then explain the four typologies of power that 
emerge from these two dimensions: bargaining, demonstrative, institutional and constitutive. 
3. Two Dimensions of Power in GVCs 
 
3.1 The Transmission Mechanisms of Power: Direct and Diffuse 
 
As we have seen, GVC and related literatures have started to differentiate (at least implicitly) 
between different kinds of power in GVCs by highlighting whether the transmission mechanisms 
of power are more direct (Gereffi 1994, Gereffi et al 2005, Coe and Yeung 2015) or more diffuse 
(Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Dallas 2014).  This distinction is used in the broader theoretical literature 
on power and has been incorporated into other useful typologies (e.g. Barnett and Duvall 2005, 
Mann 2012).  Mann differentiates ‘authoritative’ and ‘diffused’ power, with the former 
‘involv[ing] commands by an individual or collective actor and conscious obedience by 
subordinates’ and the latter as ‘spread[ing] in a relatively spontaneous, unconscious and decentered 
way.  People are constrained to act in definite ways, but not by command’ (2012: 6).  While this 
distinction is common, there are different positions over whether power must always be intentional 
and explicit, in the sense that actors only exert power when they intentionally seek to fulfill goals 
that serve their interests.  Despite this distinction, Mann is very clear that his four sources of power 
(military, political, economic, ideological) are exercised in intentional ways: ‘these [sources of 
power] are organizational means by which we can efficiently attain our varied goals, whatever 
these may be’ (ibid.).  By contrast, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 44) incorporate into ‘diffuse’ power 
many types of unintended behaviors and outcomes, which ‘provides a systematic way of thinking 
about power in terms of both agency and structure’.  Our framework falls into the latter category: 
                                                 
5 For instance, we exclude conceptualizations of power in which the preferences of actors are unconsciously formed 
that run counter to their ‘objective’ interests (Lukes 1974).   
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diffuse power includes lower degrees of intentionality – most commonly enacted through 
collective actions.   
 
In direct forms of transmission, the actor or collective wielding power and those who are objects 
of it are relatively easy to identify by all parties.  The exertion of direct power is most often 
intentional and the goals of powerful actors are well known.  Direct power also generally inheres 
within actors or collectives (including the state) in the sense that they ‘possess’ power, for instance, 
by wielding material or ideational resources, or by leveraging their structural or network position 
within a GVC.6   The utilization of these resources and the mechanisms of transmission by 
influential actors are more likely to be explicit and precise, in the sense that the exercise of control 
includes specific, measurable and monitorable requirements.  These attributes of direct power are 
often interactive.  For instance, because the actors are clearly defined, act strategically and 
intentionally in relation to each other and are in possession of well-defined resources to exert or 
accommodate power, the exercise of power tends to be more transparent, precise, and usually 
includes measuring and monitoring the behavior of actors over whom influence is exerted.  As 
elaborated in more detail in the next section, examples of the direct exertion of power include the 
relative bargaining power between two transacting firms, lead firm-specific production 
requirements and protocols for suppliers, specifications for use of technology platforms, 
government regulations, rules set by a business association for its members, or environmental 
protection standards set by third-party certifications.7   
   
But power transmission can also be diffuse, where mechanisms are based on less direct and more 
demonstrative processes, follow broader societal trends, or are based on taken-for-granted or 
emergent ‘best practices’ (e.g. corporate conduct and organization) or dominant quality 
conventions (Gibbon and Ponte 2005). Power can also be diffuse when individual actors or 
collectives fail to realize the many unintended consequences of their actions, even when they have 
real and material impacts on their interests.  The actions of powerful agents and collectives may 
have an influential demonstration effect on other actors, leading the latter to change their behavior 
in ways beneficial to the former even without the knowledge of the powerful, without their 
intention to have such an effect, or without a clear sense of who will or will not follow the 
‘demonstrator.’8  Power is diffuse when groups of actors behave in a manner akin to social 
                                                 
6 Of course, positional power in a GVC is often a function of firm resources, such as the specialized technological 
knowledge that undergirds the power of producer-driven lead firms in the GCC framework.  Furthermore, the notion 
of inherency, or possession of power is controversial.  We agree with Allen (2003) that possession of power (like 
resources) and exercise of power should be differentiated, but we are not opposed to the idea that some forms of 
power can be thought of as ‘possessed’ by an actor.  In fact, it is certainly possible for an actor in possession of 
resources to exert power without utilizing its resources, if other actors simply do not act in certain ways in 
anticipation of a counter action.  Whether this is an exercise of power depends on how one imbues the meaning of 
‘exercise.’  However, we are not arguing that all forms of power are possessed by actors (see our discussion below 
on more diffuse transmission mechanisms of power). 
 
7 In developing this, and other categories of power as ideal types, we recognize that they are rarely so clear in 
practice.  For example, the intention of specific regulations and requirements may be opaque to those who must 
follow them, and the actors setting them may be hidden or distant, especially with the spatial and cultural separation 
common in GVCs, making the specific authors difficult to identify.  
8 One could argue that all actions have unintended consequences.  We wish to differentiate unintended consequences 
which have little relevance to the wielders or objects of power in a particular situation (which can be safely ignored), 
and unintended consequences like unintended ‘demonstration effects’ which circle back and have an impact on the 
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movements.  In the GVC literature, such dynamics can be present in diffusion mechanisms such 
as the creation or demise of standards, conventions, best practices, and in bandwagoning during 
the pre-paradigmatic stages of diffusion of new technologies.  In these circumstances, actors wield 
little direct power by themselves, but when substantial numbers of actors alter their behavior in 
unison or in rapid succession, they exert increasing power through diffuse mechanisms, even 
though they do not belong to a formal organization or participate in a common network.  
 
These forms of less controlled and less intentional power have been included in various theories, 
such as those concerning the mechanisms of collective action (e.g. Granovetter 1978), emergence 
(Miller and Page 2007, Mitchell 2011), and theories of organizational ecology (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, 1984), among others.  Collective or emergent orders are not projected outward 
from a single, identifiable locus of power, but arise from the behavioral regularities of actors that 
may be unintentional or weakly intentional in terms of the goals of their collective behaviors 
(Dallas 2014).  In this case, agents may individually participate or defect in succession, perhaps 
through observations of the behavior of peers. This can create a chain of isomorphic reactions or 
herd mentality, and lead to sudden change in the dynamics of power.  In these circumstances, 
power cannot always be said to be ‘possessed’ by any particular actor.  Rather, the transmission 
of power is diffuse, and continues to be so as long as large numbers of actors behave in relative 
uniformity. Unlike precise contracts or detailed protocols, the exertion of diffuse power is not 
necessarily explicit, precise, or easy to monitor or enforce – especially when collective action 
flows from loosely organized groups.   
 
Diffuse power from social movements and collectives of actors, and the emergence of conventions 
have been well documented (e.g. Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Bair and Palpacuer 2015). Other, less 
recognizable instances of diffuse power in GVCs can come with the sudden arrival of an enabling 
technology.  While the agents introducing this technology are usually easily recognizable, the 
process by which technology is deployed is not always, or even usually, controlled by first-movers 
(though they certainly try to incentivize its adoption). Rather, it operates through a social 
movement-like adoption of technology – in which a certain threshold of (unorganized) defectors 
of a prior technology is required before a new technology can be considered truly disruptive 
(Christensen 1997),9 or when newer, ‘two-sided markets’ enabled by platforms propagate through 
network effects (Parker et al 2016).   
 
Diffuse power is also at work when ‘best practices’ are propagated, for example by consulting 
firms or pressure from financial markets for companies to conform to normative modes of behavior 
in which agreement about best practices are collectively determined.  For example, the idea of 
international ‘outsourcing’ and the mantra for firms to discover and focus on their ‘core 
competencies’ became a perceived best practice buzzword over the 1990s and 2000s.  At the time, 
outsourcing was touted as a necessary cost reduction strategy and companies were pressured to 
conform or see their market valuation decline.  By the late 2000s, the conversation over 
                                                 
actors engaged in an arena where power is being exerted, even when the set of actors is not perfectly defined.   
 
9 In fact, in Christensen’s (1997) formulation, it is smaller and technologically weaker firms which are most likely to 
become industry disrupters.  They operate within the shadow of the industry giants who often respond too late to the 
threat from below, in which underserved consumers have already bandwagoned onto the disruptive technological 
trajectory of the weaker, but rising firm.  Christensen has had to clarify this point to correct the improper and 
excessive usage of the term ‘disruptive technology’ (Christensen et al 2015).  
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outsourcing had become more sober, with companies provided with more leeway to explore 
‘optimal’ combinations of internal and external (and domestic and international) sourcing and to 
consider the ‘total cost’ of delivering product and services to customers rather than only the costs 
of goods or services sold.  Nevertheless, the early normative dialogue generated a threshold level 
of behavioral mimesis such that sufficient initial demand and cognitive legitimation (Hannan et al 
1995, Baum and Powell 1995) created the conditions for the emergence of larger, more competent 
(global) suppliers, logistics firms, and other specialized service providers; as well as infrastructure 
investments in places such as coastal China that influenced subsequent outsourcing and offshoring 
decisions.  Thus, sunk costs and prior business decisions have a co-evolutionary effect on norms 
and conventions.  
 
3.2 The Arena of Actors: Dyads and Collectives 
 
A second dimension that differentiates power in the GVC literature is the ‘arena of actors.’  An 
‘arena’ is where specific actors or collectives engage with other actors.  We propose two categories 
of actor arenas – dyads and collectives.  The dyadic arena is most often implicit in the broader 
literature on power.  For instance, in some cases, a dyadic relationship of Actor A interacting with 
Actor B is built into the definition of power (e.g. Dahl 1956), but in other cases, the population of 
actors involved in power relationships can be hard to clearly identify (e.g. Lukes 1974, Digeser 
1992).  In GVC and some related literatures (e.g. theories of the firm, strategic management), the 
focus on the inter-firm dyad is well established. This was the arena studied in Gereffi’s (1994) 
research on ‘lead’ firms – whether buyer- or producer-driven – and their links to suppliers or 
‘intermediaries’ that managed detailed contracting relationships and translated buyer requirements 
for factories.  A dyadic arena is even more the focus in Gereffi et al’s (2005) governance theory, 
which argues that three underlying factors (transactional complexity, codifiability of information 
and supplier capability) generate five distinct forms of coordination: hierarchy, captive, relational, 
modular and market, where power asymmetry decreases as one moves from hierarchy toward 
market forms of linkages. This is because power exerted between the dyadic pair is shaped by 
relative bargaining positions rooted in purchasing power and competence power (Sturgeon 2009). 
There are also cases when the focal actor in a collective engages in dyadic relationships with 
individual actors, as in negotiations or lobbying between the state and individual companies. In 
this case, the state is still a collective, but acts dyadically in specific instances. 
 
The second arena of actors in GVCs, less explicitly researched and theorized, involves ‘collectives’ 
of actors.  The locus of power in this case is a function of the collective behaviors of multiple 
players acting simultaneously (intentionally or not) and/or of more institutionalized collectives 
such as business associations, multi-stakeholder initiatives, or states.  We avoid using the term 
‘institutions’ here, because not all collective arenas have institutional or organizational traits. 
Therefore, we reserve the term ‘institutional power’ for cases where the collective arena is 
combined with direct power transmission (one of our four combinations in Figure 1).   In an 
institutionalized collective, there is a focal organization (such as the state) that sets more or less 
transparent rules for all, or for specific groups of actors (e.g. in industrial policy), who experience 
the rules and their consequences along with others. Any bargaining by actors takes place in the 
context of the collective (e.g. through an industry association), and this distinguishes power 
dynamics in collectives from that operating through dyadic interactions –e.g. between the state and 
individual companies.  
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While a collective might appear to be a unitary actor with uniform and coherent rules, leadership 
or organization, it might also be more loosely organized and coordinated. There is variability 
within collectives, and some have developed a degree of formal organization or explicitly codified 
rules and may imbue certain actors with leadership – though not enough to consider them fully 
institutional actors – and be more likely to exert direct power.  By contrast, collectives of actors in 
which no single or clear organization can be identified, few codified rules exist, and a sense of 
leadership is lacking are those more likely to exert diffuse power. This might be the case with 
informal conventions, social movements, and in looser networks that are not built around a central 
organization. Here, the boundaries of those ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ in the arena are not exactly 
knowable, perhaps even for the actors themselves. 
4. Four Types of Power in GVCs 
 
Combining the two types of transmission mechanisms and the two arenas of actors explained in 
the previous section yields four ideal types of power in GVCs: bargaining, institutional, 
demonstrative and constitutive (see Figure 1).   
 
It is worth reiterating that both dimensions of the typology are not strict categories, and differ only 
by matters of degree.  This is obvious for the direct-diffuse dimension, but is also the case for 
defining the arena of actors.  For instance, collectives include looser networks as well as more 
fully institutionalized forms. It is also worth noting that these various types of power are 
combinatory in specific GVCs, meaning that they are not mutually exclusive and thus they can 
become mixed, layered and linked together in complex ways and in different combinations over 
time.  For instance, the power of any GVC actor in a particular situation frequently combines more 
than one of these forms of power at a single point in time.  This can happen because one type of 
power may be partly derived or dependent upon another form of power, such as when the (dyadic) 
bargaining power of one firm over another derives from its positional power in a collective, or 
when a supplier uses its dyadic competence power to encapsulate valuable assets formerly held by 
a collective (e.g. moves to make open source software proprietary).  One type of power can 
transform into another type, for instance when vaguely defined best practices are codified as a de 
facto standard or even maintained and enforced as a de jure standard – representing a shift from 
diffuse to more direct power within collectives. This suggests that it is important to carry out 
evolutionary analyses of how different transmission mechanisms and areas of actors overlap and 
evolve over time. 
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Figure 1: A Typology of Power in Global Value Chains (GVCs) 
 
 Direct Diffuse 
 
 
Dyadic 
 
Bargaining Power 
 
 Operates in firm to firm relations 
 Exhibits different degrees in 
hierarchy, captive, relational, 
modular, and market linkages 
 Is shaped by the relationship 
between lead firm/platform 
owner requirements and supplier 
competencies 
 
 
Demonstrative Power 
 
 Operates through informal 
‘transmission’ mechanisms along 
value chains and/or competitive 
mimicry among suppliers and would‐
be platform owners 
 Is shaped by quality conventions 
implicitly accepted by the parties of 
a dyadic transaction  
 
 
 
 
Collective 
 
Institutional Power 
 
 Operates through government 
regulation and/or multi‐
stakeholder initiatives or other 
institutionalized forms  
 Can be leveraged through 
industrial standards and codified 
‘best practices’ 
 Helps to build platforms and 
stimulates their network effects, 
extending to platform 
ecosystems  
 
 
Constitutive Power 
 
 Is based on broadly accepted norms, 
conventions, expectations and best 
practices, e.g. financialization, 
‘platform ideologies’ 
 Can be leveraged by social and 
consumer movements 
 Arises from user‐induced platform 
adjustments, extensions, and fully 
open platforms that stretch them 
beyond established ecosystems and 
opens up space for new platform 
owners 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: examples are illustrative, not comprehensive 
 
 
4.1 ‘Bargaining’ Power – Dyadic and Direct 
 
Bargaining power is clearly the most common form of power found in GVC and related literatures.  
This is partly because of a focus on linkages between ‘lead’ firms in advanced economies and 
suppliers in developing countries (Gereffi 1994, Gereffi et al 2005).  Lead firm power is based on 
production expertise, control over distribution channels, design, and customer relationships in end 
markets.  In GVC governance theory, the arena of actors is specifically identified as being variable: 
internal to the firm in the hierarchical form, strongly dyadic in the captive form, less so in the 
relational form, and weakening rapidly across the modular and market forms, where the 
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codification of the inter-firm linkage both enables and necessitates suppliers serving multiple lead 
firms.  In other words, it is the number of possible partners that in part drives the predicted level 
of power asymmetry in GVC governance theory. Still, the arena of actors is populated only by 
firms, and the analysis of power is based in a series of firm-to-firm (dyadic) bargaining snapshots. 
As attention shifted to various forms of supplier power, the dyadic relationship has remained 
central to the analysis of power, as supplier power is mainly judged in relation to lead firms.  
 
Clearly, the category of bargaining power (where the arena of actors is dyadic and the transmission 
mechanism direct) is essential.  However, it is important to remember that the four categories of 
power in our framework are not mutually exclusive, but rather are layered and combinatory.  As 
mentioned above, dyadic power can also be exerted between individual firms and states.10 And 
even though bargaining power is exerted directly between dyads of firms, power that is external 
to the relationship sometimes undergirds the particular linkage (see below under different forms 
of collective power).  For instance, even though ‘modular’ is a description of a type of dyadic 
linkage, this form of power often derives from collective diffusion processes — many firms 
bandwagon by adopting a particular standard, providing complementary assets, or selling products 
or services over platforms (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, 2008).  Thus, modularity can be thought 
of as operating on more than one level of analysis (dyad and collective), and as a layered 
combination in which different types of power might be expressed. 
 
4.2 ‘Demonstrative’ Power – Dyadic and Diffuse 
  
Increasing requirements in a dyadic GVC relationship can shape more than the behavior and 
choices of suppliers. It can also create a demonstration effect among all suppliers or would-be 
suppliers of a particular good or service, in addition to second tier suppliers and beyond. This may 
occur through many mechanisms.  For instance, a specific form of upgrading may induce 
adaptation among competing suppliers, or among suppliers wishing to compete in the future.  If 
they cannot meet these elevated requirements, suppliers can be ‘excluded’ from GVCs, and may 
be forced to ‘downgrade’ to serve less demanding customers.   
 
Transmission of new requirements can also occur in more formal ways such as when first tier or 
more downstream firms impose new standards or requirements upon other tiers of upstream 
suppliers.  Depending on how explicit and interactive the coordination is between lead firms and 
first tier suppliers, this power may fall between the bargaining and demonstrative categories.  In 
other words, the outcome of bargaining within particular dyads can subsequently spread along the 
value chain and in contiguous industries through demonstration effects.  While this form of power 
                                                 
10 For example, in Vietnam in 2015, Samsung operated under a set of investment rules that included a requirement to 
spend 1% of revenues on R&D in Vietnam in order to take advantage of a series of incentives targeting companies 
in ‘high tech’ industries. Incentives included exemptions from land use levies, significant reductions in enterprise 
income tax, value-added tax and import and export duties; and eligibility to receive funding from the National Hi-
Tech Development Program, a fund earmarked for high-tech enterprise development. However, Samsung had 
already invested US$ 9 billion, had production topping 120 million units, and employed 75,000 (with projections to 
add another 25,000 by 2016). With revenues from exports growing accordingly, the company’s R&D spending 
commitment soon outgrew the capacity of its Vietnam Mobile R&D Center to spend it. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology suspended the R&D spending requirement, but only for Samsung (Sturgeon and Zylberberg 2016). 
 
16 
 
is acknowledged in existing literatures, there is less effort to precisely assess these adaptations and 
demonstration effects – a key criticism arising from the disarticulation literature (Bair and Werner 
2011).  More research is needed to explain dynamics external to (but nevertheless contiguous to) 
dyadic GVC activities, so that dynamic ‘strategic choices’ faced by suppliers and other less 
powerful firms in GVCs can be better understood (Sako and Zylberberg 2016).    
 
4.3 ‘Institutional’ Power – Collective and Direct 
 
Institutional power is a form of direct power that is exercised by collectives that are more formally 
organized (e.g. in business associations, multi-stakeholder initiatives, shared technological 
platforms, or within the state). While power in dyadic relationships stems from resources 
controlled by a single organization, such as technological or organizational know-how or financial 
and other material resources, in collective arenas it is at least partly external, in the sense of being 
dependent upon the strategic actions of groups of actors, or upon the rules set by formally 
organized collectives (e.g. industry associations or the state).  
 
The state, when regulating the conduct of all actors or categories of actors, applies institutional 
power. Multi-stakeholder initiatives, collectives where stakeholders are clearly identified, and 
which provide voluntary tools for business conduct or the social and environmental conditions of 
production, also exercise institutional power. When these initiatives end up developing third-party 
certifications, they also indirectly shape dyadic relationships – as buyers can require specific 
certifications from suppliers to meet specific sustainability requirements. As a result, non-firm 
actors, and especially international NGOs, have been increasingly examined in the GVC literature. 
Unlike dyadic arenas in which one could say that actors exert power over other actors, in collective 
arenas, power is more likely to derive from the actions of multiple actors.  
 
This does not mean that a collective of actors is likely to exist in perfect harmony.  There can be, 
and usually is, substantial and even debilitating contention within any collective action, and 
conflicts may involve innumerable dyadic relationships.  Moreover, collectives such as standard-
setting bodies often provide arenas where powerful actors jockey for the inclusion of terms that 
are especially favorable, for example when powerful firms in the telecom sector lobby for inclusion 
of proprietary technologies in new generations of interconnect standards (e.g. 3G, 4G, 5G) as a 
way to lower costs of compliance and earn revenues from technology licensing.  The same market 
power and firm-specific resources that would give these incumbent firms power in dyadic 
relationships can be leveraged in collectives as well.  
 
A less intuitive form of institutional power is derived through network effects in the platform 
organizational form.  Network effects describe the increase in the value of a product or service 
when more firms or consumers acquire or use it.  For instance, this is the logic underlying ‘platform 
ownership,’ in which the focal firm partially opens up its technology and incentivizes other firms 
to provide products or services that are complementary to a platform or consumer to use the 
platform (Gawer and Cusumano 2002).  Many of the largest and most powerful and profitable 
technology companies today, such as Microsoft, Intel, Qualcomm, Facebook, Google, Amazon, 
Uber, Tencent, and Alibaba, derive their power through platform ownership. While this type of 
power remains reliant on the continued participation of its user base, and power is partially external 
to the focal firm, the power of the platform owner can increase quickly and to very high levels if 
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platforms can provide services that users feel is indispensable and network effects remain strong 
(Gawer and Cusumano 2008).   
 
What distinguishes institutional power from bargaining power is that it derives from the combined 
actions of actors that share a clear membership in an initiative or organization, use a particular 
standard, or link to a common platform.  As the degree of formal institutionalization diminishes, 
‘institutional’ power (collective and direct) gradually turns into ‘constitutive’ power (collective 
and diffuse), discussed next.  
 
4.4 ‘Constitutive’ Power – Collective and Diffuse 
  
Constitutive power is often manifested when collective arenas do not exhibit clear or formal 
common membership or interest. In constitutive power, there is no institutionalized focal point 
directing influence or guiding diffusion and adoption.  Furthermore, it may arise in situations 
where it is the users’ creative utilization and adaptation of a platform that makes it dominant – not 
the platform leader itself. Examples of constitutive power also include the diffusion of outsourcing 
or financialization as general models against which firms come to progressively structure 
themselves, which in turn shape GVC structures and restructuring processes (Gibbon and Ponte 
2005), the increasing importance of sustainability concerns in the governance of GVCs (Ponte 
2014), and/or the normative role exerted by social movements on corporate conduct and 
transparency (Bair and Palpacuer 2015).  
 
Constitutive power emerges when broad-based collective action involves far less formal 
institutionalization or less clear common identity or purpose. Constitutive power is less explicitly 
codified, is applied through less precise measurement techniques and standards, and requires less 
direct forms of enforcement.  However, actors still know and agree when a general norm or 
convention has been violated and sanctions are often collectively imposed, though again 
enforcement is decentralized and often subtle and nuanced compared to the pre-ordained arbiters 
and judges that may be used in institutional power. On the one hand, constitutive power can 
become increasingly formalized and codified and thus re-emerge as institutional power. On the 
other hand, institutional power can be challenged, de-legitimized and de-codified, and practices 
and norms re-emerge in more informal ways as constitutive power.  
 
The main difference between institutional and constitutive power is that in institutional power the 
transmission is direct, while in constitutive power it is diffuse. This does not mean that sanctions 
or rewards from constitutive power are less regular or certain, but that these are enforced upon 
each actor by everyone else in the arena, rather than being oriented and carried out by a focal actor 
(such as the state, an industry association or a certification agency). Many norms, broad 
conventions and best practices exist in this non-formalized state.  
 
 
5. Empirical Applications 
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In this section, we apply our typology to three empirical examples and include stylized graphic 
representations of the actors, arenas of actors, power transmission mechanisms, and actor 
constellations for each case.  Figure 2 provides a basis for the case-specific figures that follow.  It 
include symbols for three types of firm-level actors: lead firms, suppliers and 3rd party developers, 
and lead firms with more than one line of business — based on the assumption that sourcing 
requirements and relationships tend to be distinct from one line of business to the next.  A few 
additional actors are specified, including states, organizations such as non-governmental 
organizations and industry associations, and individuals.  The ‘arena of actors’ follows the 
framework provided in Figure 1, with direct power transmission represented by solid lines, with 
varying line thickness based on the degree power asymmetry between actor dyads.  Indirect power 
is represented by dotted lines – showing the diffuse influence of specific actors on others.  
Collectives are represented by circles that can accommodate any number of actors, with solid or 
dashed lines to represent direct and indirect power transmission.  
 
In the ‘actor constellations’ section of Figure 2 we provide a few emblematic, highly stylized 
examples of power relationships in actor groupings.  These include a lead firm with supplier 
relationships, where ‘bargaining power’ is transmitted directly in dyadic linkages that range from 
low power asymmetry with market linkages to very high with captive linkages following Gereffi 
et al (2005), and an example of a lead firm with two lines of business, each with its own supplier 
relationships with various levels of power asymmetry.  We also include a representation of state-
firm dyadic bargaining, since powerful firms commonly negotiate terms directly with governments 
and government agencies, either as one-off agreements or as exceptions to existing regulations. In 
the category of ‘demonstrative power’, we indicate how transmission mechanisms operate 
indirectly in dyadic linkages. In ‘institutional power’, collections of actors exert (stronger or 
weaker) power within groups: we provide an example of a platform owner and the suppliers and 
3rd party developers that provide components or complementary products or services, as well as 
simple examples of a state regulating affected firms and other institutions. In the category of 
‘constitutive power’, constellations of actors exert indirect power in collectives: we provide 
examples of an open platform, where loosely connected individuals and organizations contribute 
to a set of freely available yet inter-operable technologies, and of a social movement where more 
or less coordinated groups of individuals and organizations pursue a specific goal or set of goals.   
 
These simple, highly stylized diagrams are by no means meant to represent an exhaustive set of 
actor constellations.  Social movements can involve any type of actor and sometimes evolve to 
develop more structure, including centralized organizations with selective membership.  Multi-
stakeholder initiatives can also involve a range of actors, and exhibit both direct (institutional) and 
diffuse (constitutive) power relationships among actors.  Most importantly for the three empirical 
examples that follow, firms, industries, organizations, technology platforms, and social 
movements both evolve over time and usually involve an interacting set of actors and actor 
constellations.  With this in mind, we can see how the distinctions between the four forms of power 
developed in this paper can be used to trace how organizations and movements ‘borrow’ ideas 
from actors with demonstration power, organize more explicitly or more loosely, and experience 
spin-offs, extensions, and geographic transformations over time. 
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Figure 2. Power in GVCs: actors, arenas, transmission mechanisms & actor constellations 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Our first example explores the power configurations at play in the wine GVC. This case lays out 
the complex dynamics of power as characterizations of ‘quality’ change in the industry. Our 
second example traces the institutionalization of labor standards in apparel. Here, we follow the 
development of labor standards from the initial formation of social movements to a set of multi-
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stakeholder initiatives. In both examples, we specifically consider how actors outside of value 
chain intercede upon firm-level actors within the chain.  Our third example compares mobile 
phones with different operating systems to highlight different types of ‘platform-based’ collectives 
(based on direct and indirect power). In all examples, we include a temporal dimension that depicts 
the power dynamics in shifting actor constellations over time.  
 
5.1 Power in wine GVCs 
 
Power configurations in wine GVCs are graphically summarized in Figure 3.  The wine GVC 
highlights the importance of power beyond dyadic bargaining and traditional top-down 
institutional processes. Of course, ‘coercive’ bargaining power is still important.  In buyer-supplier 
relations, power is exercised through bargaining over product specifications (price, quantity, 
various quality traits, varietal, origin, certifications, packaging), product portfolios and logistics. 
Traditionally, depending on the quality segment, bargaining power (dyadic, direct) has been 
concentrated in buyers’ hands in lower end markets, while producers could exercise more power 
in higher end markets. However, with an increasing proportion of wine now sold through retailers 
carrying a wide portfolio of quality, rather than through specialist shops, bargaining power is now 
being consolidated in buyers’ hands.  
 
Demonstrative power (dyadic, diffuse) in the wine GVC had traditionally been wielded by élite 
wine producers in some of the top regions of the ‘Old World’ (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal). This 
was both reinforced and challenged by journalists and professional tasters through their reviews. 
The ideational creation of the ‘new wine consumer’, however, has revolutionized the dynamics of 
demonstrative power (Itçaina et al 2016). The idea of the new consumer was developed by a 
relatively small number of marketing experts (supported by biochemists and economists) in ‘New 
World’ producing countries (the US, Australia, South Africa, Chile and Argentina) and facilitated 
by the growing sales of wine in supermarkets. The new consumer is portrayed as demanding more 
standardized and predictable wines, year after year – something that New World wine producers 
are better equipped to deliver given their less regulated wine industries (Ibid.). Demonstrative 
power has thus moved away from producers and shifted to other actors that are now shaping ‘new’ 
wine styles and aesthetic preferences of producers, such as wine tasters/scorers (e.g. Robert 
Parker), marketers, and ‘flying winemakers’ and other consultants (e.g. viticulturists, marketers) 
who move from one property or country to another to help wine producers achieve whatever wine 
styles are fashionable at the time. In other words, we have observed a movement from producer-
driven demonstration effects to demand-driven demonstration effects – which itself consolidates 
the shift of bargaining power towards large-scale and diversified wine buyers.  
 
While institutional power (collective, direct) in wine GVCs is most clearly exercised by the public 
sector through local, national and regional regulation (e.g. production quotas and planting 
registers, distillation subsidies, production rules dictated by appellation d'origine contrôlée 
systems), multi-stakeholder initiatives also play an important role, such as fair trade, organic and 
biodynamic certification bodies, industry associations and wine exhibitions, fairs and competitions 
(Ponte 2009). Regulatory interventions have been historically stronger in Old World countries – 
originating first in France and diffusing to other countries and eventually to the EU level. 
Regulation also provided a strong platform for producers and their associations to exercise 
relatively strong bargaining power vis à vis their buyers. However, pressure to adapt regulation to 
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the demands of the ‘new consumer’ and to recover market share from New World wines has led 
to major regulatory adjustments in Old World countries, especially following the 2008 EU wine 
market reform. This included a simplification of categories for geographic indication wines, the 
permission to sell ‘table wines’ under a brand name, the possibility to indicate grape varietal, and 
the abandonment of the main forms of ‘production’ support (Itçaina et al 2016). Most of these 
reforms have moved institutional power away from producers and their associations and towards 
marketers, merchants and retailers.   
 
Figure 3. Illustration of power dynamics in wine GVCs 
Source: Authors 
 
Constitutive power (collective, indirect) emanates from local, national, regional and sometimes 
global understandings and valuations. It can help highlight important, yet more subtle 
manifestations of power in the wine GVC. These emanate from broadly accepted preferences for 
certain wine styles or varietals (which are often specific to local or national markets); 
understandings of novelty and tradition and their legitimacy; preferred packaging (e.g. screwcaps 
or bag-in-box are exclusively used for low price wine in some markets, but not in others) and 
labeling (preferences in relation to branding, grape varietal, appellation, terroir, sustainability 
certifications); dominant understandings of ‘best practice’ related to viticulture, winemaking 
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and/or labor relations; and acceptable relations between geo-physical properties and human 
intervention in winemaking (e.g. whether the winemaker is supposed to ‘shape’ the wine or let the 
terroir express itself). Constitutive power in wine GVCs also operates as a transmission 
mechanism for institutional reform (e.g. the 2008 EU wine reform) and as an amplifier of dyadic 
demonstration effects.  
 
Overall, although changes in overall power dynamics tend to be geographically-specific, we can 
observe the following trends in the global wine GVC in general terms: more emphasis on demand-
driven quality definitions; increased acceptance of non-traditional packaging solutions and use of 
brand names and grape varietals on labels; more emphasis on human and biochemical crafting of 
wine to the detriment of nature determinants; and broader acceptance of non-traditional techniques 
and additives. Overall, many of these trends are reinforcing the power of merchants and retailers 
at the expense of producers (especially small-scale ones), and the power of New World value chain 
actors at the expense of Old World actors. At the same time, a growing group of Old World actors 
are themselves adopting techniques and marketing tools developed by New World producers and 
merchants; and the EU has reformed its regulatory framework to be more nimble. These counter-
measures are themselves reshaping power dynamics within Old World producing countries in 
favor of ‘more modern’, larger and more capitalized operators.  
 
5.2 Power in apparel GVCs: multi-stakeholder initiatives in labor standards  
 
Actors external to a GVC also influence each other, leverage demonstration power, build 
institutional power, and eventually often exert direct power over firms within a chain.  This is a 
slow, evolutionary process of change among a multitude of actors, so this example highlights how 
different forms of power become layered over time.  A good illustration of these dynamics is the 
creation of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that arose in the 1990s and 2000s to generate and 
diffuse labor standards in light industries, as depicted in Figure 4.  Key MSIs were the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) in the United States, both of which 
monitor and audit factories and seek to enforce labor standards.  While these two MSIs eventually 
developed institutional power, they evolved from a complex amalgam of constitutive, 
demonstrative and institutional forms of power, including government action under the Clinton 
administration.   
 
Before the formalization of MSIs, global labor standards were promoted through consciousness 
raising among the general population and through loosely connected communities of various 
NGOs, including consumer groups, religious organizations, universities and student groups, 
human rights groups and labor organizations, including unions. During the late 1990s, they 
collectively raised consumer consciousness about ‘sweatshop’ working conditions in light 
industries, especially apparel.  Over time, these loose organizations united together into an 
increasingly organized social movement wielding constitutive power.   
 
Demonstrative power played a key role in the institutionalization of these loose alliances.  Both 
the pre-MSI NGOs and the stakeholders creating the MSIs regularly utilized the International 
Labor Organization’s (ILO) long-standing ‘Declaration on the Principles and Rights of Workers’ 
and its published core labor standards in generating their mission statements, internal standards, 
monitoring and other organizational characteristics and goals.  While the ILO is often criticized 
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for its lack of enforcement mechanisms (and inability to even get member states to ratify their 
conventions), it does exert demonstrative power in that it has established global standards and 
offers training sessions, information, and discussion forums, all within a framework of member 
states, which NGOs regularly appropriate when shaping their own objectives and organizations.     
 
Figure 4. Illustration of power dynamics in multi-stakeholder initiatives for labor standards 
in apparel GVCs 
 Source: Authors 
 
While it was active prior to the mid-1990s, the movement was suddenly energized in the United 
States by media revelations in 1995 and 1996 of poor working conditions in foreign factories 
supplying firms like Nike, The Gap, and Kathy Lee Gifford’s private label garments (Mandle 
2000).  Jolted by the media coverage and under pressure by these social groups, the Clinton 
administration established a taskforce in 1996 and initiated meetings, which brought global apparel 
and sporting goods buyers and a collection of leading NGOs together into a loose organization, 
the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) – exerting institutional power.  Although the AIP collapsed 
when key unions and NGOs withdrew their support, the multi-stakeholder talks continued for three 
years, after which a multi-stakeholder NGO called the Fair Labor Association (FLA) was formed.  
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Through this process, various US government agencies played key roles by providing momentum, 
credibility and media attention.  However, the government also used more coercive forms of 
power, such as the threat of government regulation of global buyers to get them to the bargaining 
table, and later the US State Department and USAID provided grants to establish the FLA and 
develop its programs (MacDonald 2011).11  At the same time, the collapse of the AIP led hundreds 
of universities and student groups to found the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) in 
1998, and their own monitoring organization in 2000, the Worker Rights Consortium, which 
specializes on collegiate apparel and allows for less corporate participation (Featherstone and 
USAS 2002).   
 
The power of the FLA and WRC is founded upon the credibility that they lend to compliant 
companies (both participating suppliers and suppliers of participating buyers and licensees) that 
have undergone their factory audits, ongoing monitoring, and corrective remediation.  This has 
implications for bargaining power in apparel GVCs. The power of these organizations to enforce 
standards is largely based on excluding member companies that fail audits or refuse to undergo 
remediation.  Whether or not the withdrawal of MSI certification has an effect depends partly on 
the reactions of supporting civil society groups in ‘naming and shaming’ or the effects 
decertification has on regulators, employees, partners, and consumers.  Global buyers who become 
members use their bargaining power to insist that their suppliers undergo FLA audits and 
remediation (bargaining power), though enforcement is mixed.  Suppliers themselves can be 
members of the FLA, which also can be used to gain competitive advantage over competitors.  
 
When suppliers comply with these labor standards, dyadic governance often shifts from market-
based linkages to stronger forms of direct power (toward relational linkages, for example).  This 
pattern has also been observed in UK supermarket sourcing of fresh vegetables from Africa (Dolan 
and Humphrey 2001).  Over time, these MSIs have expanded their functions from more strict 
‘compliance’ activities (monitoring and corrections) to what Locke et al (2009) call a 
‘commitment-oriented approach,’ in which the FLA provides factories with capacity-building 
resources, like technical assistance, ‘root cause analysis,’ joint problem solving and information 
on industry best practices.  As such, the shifts from market linkages toward relational linkages 
driven my stricter labor standards can be seen to increase supplier competencies and foment 
upgrading. 
 
5.3 Power in GVCs for smart phone operating systems 
 
The development of the mobile phone industry has been extremely rapid and far-reaching, and has 
evolved in two distinct periods with very different power dynamics characterized by ‘feature 
phones’ and ‘smart phones.’  The feature phone period can be dated to the early 1990s, when the 
mass market for consumer handsets expanded rapidly with smaller handsets, falling prices and an 
expanding network infrastructure.  Bargaining power in the GVC was mainly concentrated in a 
set of incumbent lead handset firms with a long presence in the telecommunications industry, most 
prominently including Nokia (Finland), Motorola (USA), Ericsson (Sweden), and Siemens 
(Germany).  Together these four firms held about 60% share of the handset market through 2007.  
By the mid-2000s the market share of newcomers Samsung and LG (South Korea) had increased 
                                                 
11 The FLA is a robust MSI in that companies, universities and NGOs each hold six voting seats on the Board, and 
some decisions require two-thirds of the vote from each group (MacDonald 2011).   
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to about 20% (Gartner Inc., various years), but the structure of the industry was relatively stable 
(Sturgeon and Linden 2010).  While handsets were mainly used for making calls, they came to be 
known as ‘feature phones’ as they accumulated additional functions (features), escalating from 
simple contact lists and call logs to increasingly complex games, audio and video playback 
features, email, cameras, and browsers providing access to simplified websites on the ‘mobile 
internet.’    
 
As in the broader electronics industry, high levels of modularity in product design and in the supply 
chain meant that lead firms could source a variety of components from external suppliers when 
designing their phones — from simple to complex.  As in the personal computer (PC) industry, 
where Intel central processing chip sets provide a rising share of end-product functionality 
(Kawakami 2011), lead firms in the mobile handset industry mainly rely on ‘modem chip sets’ 
provided by suppliers with a great deal of competence-derived bargaining power (e.g. Qualcomm 
and Texas Instruments) to accomplish the complex task of connecting phones to compatible 
networks.  However, in the feature phone period, integrative system-level design of each model of 
phone was generally carried out internally, and this represented a non-trivial set of competencies 
that allowed handset makers (lead firms) to retain bargaining power.  However, as the number of 
features escalated, integrating them became an increasingly laborious and expensive process, 
raising the risks associated with failure (Thun and Sturgeon 2017).   A few firms took the risk of 
weakening their bargaining position in the chain when they banded together to support a shared 
operating system for running feature applications, an effort that proved to be short-lived.12 
 
Figure 5 depicts a few of the power relationships in the smart phone phase of the mobile phone 
handset industry, which can be dated to January 2007 when Apple introduced the iPhone, a new 
type of keypadless handset based on a mobile version of Apple’s operating system called iOS.  
Like Mac and Windows-based PCs, the iPhone was set up from the beginning as a platform to run 
a suite of Apple-supplied and 3rd party applications, available on-line through Apple’s ‘App Store’.  
The iPhone also included a mobile version of Apple’s iTunes music playback software, providing 
easy access to Apple’s iTunes on-line store already popular with desktop PC users and users of 
Apple’s iPod portable music player.   
 
These two platform ecosystems (iTunes and the App Store) attracted thousands of content 
providers (music licensors, podcast producers, and internet radio stations) and app developers, and 
through a classic network effects, this boosted the usefulness and attractiveness of the iPhone for 
new users.  Apps included with the phone comprised a mobile version of Apple’s Safari internet 
browser, which allowed users to interact with regular (not only mobile) websites, Google Maps, 
and a YouTube mobile video player.  After selling 1.4 million units in 2007, sales grew at an 
annual average rate of 90%, reaching 231 million units in 2015 (Dormehl 2015).  Huge sales 
growth and a proprietary ecosystem allowed Apple to set handset prices high and capture a 
reported 94% of smartphone industry profits by 2015, up from 84% a few years earlier (Dilger 
2015).  Bargaining power is still important, given the strength of the company’s buyer power, and 
Apple’s dyadic and direct linkages to suppliers vary depending on the nature of the linkage (with 
the occasional internalization of key iOS-compatible inputs).  However, the company also exerts 
                                                 
12 The Symbian feature phone operating system, originally developed by a UK-based software company and 
compatible only with processors that used ARM technology, was promoted most aggressively by Nokia but also 
used in keyboard-based ‘smartphones’ made by Motorola and Sony-Ericsson (Thun and Sturgeon 2017: 8). 
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dyadic control in bargaining relationships with suppliers to its ecosystems, whose products must 
follow Apple’s application programming interface (API) specifications to be accepted on the App 
Store.  Nevertheless, such platform constellations provide an arena for institutional power as 3rd 
parties increase the value of the platform, and 3rd parties can in turn be disciplined through user 
product reviews organized by the platform owner. 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of power dynamics in mobile handset GVCs: Apple iOS handsets vs. 
Linux-based Google Android handsets 
Source: Authors 
 
The iPhone, running iOS, was closely followed in 2008 by Google’s Android operating system.  
While handsets running Android have features similar to the iPhone, including a platform 
ecosystem centered around the GooglePlay store, offering apps and content, Google provided 
Android to handset makers for free, with the strategy of driving mobile users to the internet where 
the company’s dominant position in search would mean rising revenues from advertising.  Since 
the Android OS encapsulated many of the integrative functions previously carried out by handset 
makers, incumbents firms found their core system integration competencies (and bargaining 
power) cannibalized and most fell by the wayside in only a few years.13  This opened the field for 
                                                 
13 Only Samsung was able to make a successful transition to Android-based handsets. 
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a bevy of competitors offering Android-compatible phones.  Low prices drove sales (but not 
profits) that far surpassed the iPhone.  Sales of Android smartphones grew at an annual average 
rate of 175% per year through 2016, leveling out at about 80% of the market by 2013 when 761 
million units were sold (Gartner Inc. various years).  In May 2017, Google reported that devices 
running Android had reached two billion active monthly users (Dormehl 2015). 
 
While the Android platform ecosystem shares many of the features of the iPhone ecosystem, a 
crucial difference is that is it a proprietary ‘distribution’ of Linux, an open source operating 
system.14 Linux and related code is freely available online through the Linux Foundation, and has 
an active community of software developers that makes improvements to Linux, offers new Linux 
‘distributions’ for specific applications, and provides informal online technical support for 
engineers using Linux software.  While the initial motivation for many software engineers was to 
undermine the near-monopoly-level bargaining power held by Microsoft on PC operating systems, 
Linux’s penetration in PCs has been modest.  However, more than a third of internet servers run 
Linux, as do a host of consumer electronics devices.  Thus, the constitutive power accumulated by 
the Linux software community remains strong.  At the same time, companies such as Red Hat, 
Canonical, and SUSE, have developed for-profit business models by selling proprietary 
distributions of Linux, often tailored for specific purposes, and providing support for large 
companies using Linux to use in their products and run their IT systems.  Like Android, these 
create adjacent platform ecosystems that in turn support a host of 3rd party developers 
(Opensource.com 2017).  In Figure 5, these appear under constitutive power because they 
platforms are founded on the Linux “kernel”, remain deeply linked with the ongoing developments 
in the Linux open source community.  Nevertheless, they mainly function as proprietary, closed 
platforms because they have clearly defined and monitored boundaries and rules for participation 
by 3rd parties, and thus can be seen to have re-emerged in the arena of institutional power.   
 
In sum, we see power in the mobile telecommunications GVC shifting from dyadic to institutional 
as the industry made an abrupt transition from feature to smart phones after 2007.  This is based 
in part on the co-option of constitutive power as proprietary distributions of Linux, such as 
Android, migrate into the institutional arena through the establishment of closed platforms. The 
demonstrative power of the platform model has also been very strong, not least because of the 
success of both iOS and Android, and this in turn has helped to spur the creation of a host of 
downstream platform-based mobile ecosystems such as Uber, AirBnB, and WeChat (Parker et al 
2017, Thun and Sturgeon 2017)  
6. Conclusion  
 
Power has often been an unspoken companion in scholarly efforts to explain some of the key 
dynamics of the global economy. This is especially the case in GVC analyses, despite the fact that 
                                                 
14 Linux itself is based on Unix, a computer operating system developed at Bell Laboratories in 1969.  In 1985 
Richard Stallman, one of UNIX’s developers, then a professor at MIT, formed the Free Software Foundation to 
develop and distribute free operating system software.  In 1991, Linus Torvalds, a Finnish college student, 
developed software code that was adopted as the system’s ‘kernel’ by engineers working on it (Linux is derived 
from a combination of Linus and UNIX).   A central organization — the Linux Foundation — eventually emerged, 
which includes the continued involvement of Linus Torvalds as a key consultant (Bretthauer 2001). 
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power is an explicit element in GVC theory and scholarship.  Power, like finance and gender 
dynamics, tends to be both everywhere and nowhere in GVC literature.  In this paper, we examine 
the various ways in which power has been conceptualized and applied in the GVC literature and 
provide an analytical typology to provide guidance for future research. Our typology has two 
dimensions: the arena of actors (dyads and collectives) and the precision of power (direct and 
diffuse). This yields four main forms of power: bargaining (dyadic and direct), demonstrative 
(dyadic and diffuse), institutional (collective and direct) and constitutive (collective and indirect).  
 
This framework can help isolate various forms of power, and provide a starting point for 
understanding how they mix and transform over time.  As our empirical examples show, GVCs’ 
power dynamics layer, evolve, consolidate and diffuse through distinct mechanisms and 
trajectories.  Our assumption is that researchers in this field may find it useful to first dissect and 
theorize these different forms of power as separate layers, before re-unifying them into holistic 
narratives, and engage in analysis of how these layers and combinations change over time.   
 
Each type of power may require distinct research methods and data collection techniques.  For 
instance, the early period of constitutive power may require archival research or content analysis 
of previous or current media sources to understand the origins and diffusion of fundamental norms, 
conventions, practices or the early formation of nascent organizations. Institutional power may 
require the application of detailed process tracing techniques of company and other stakeholder 
organizational records or contracts to understand the conflict over the birth of more formal 
agreements and initiatives.  Interviews may be useful for understand the alternating contention and 
consent between firms and their suppliers and other stakeholders, whether directly (through 
bargaining power) or more diffusely (through demonstration power). Ultimately, our hope is that 
differentiating the micro-foundations of distinct types of power and how they intermix in particular 
situations and over time will lead to a deeper understanding of how GVCs operate, including who 
benefits and who does not. 
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